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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT:
THE NEXT FRONTIER AT THE SEC

JW Verret*
I. INTRODUCTION

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has undergone
measured change in the last fifteen years in the way it executes its
mission to protect investors. Since reforms adopted in 1996, the SEC
has operated under a new mandate to consider the effect of new rules on
efficiency, competition, and capital formation. That new guiding legal
principle, accompanying pressure from courts, and oversight from
Congress have spurred measured reforms at the SEC and have begun to
change the structure and culture of the agency with respect to its
rulemaking process.
That process reform effort has been supported by a preliminary
investment in a small group of new economists at the SEC, housed in
the new Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (DERA). This Article
argues that these developments are incomplete unless the SEC's
economic analysis capability is similarly used to apply robust scrutiny to
the SEC's enforcement process as well. This Article draws on lessons
from the FTC's successful application of economic analysis to its
enforcement process in order to develop practical reforms for the SEC.
II. BACKGROUND ON ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AT THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
COMMISSION

A. Legal and PoliticalAction to Enhance the Role ofEconomics at the
SEC
Economic analysis at the Securities and Exchange Commission has
recently become a hot topic, owing to a series of successful challenges
to SEC rules on the basis of insufficient analysis culminating in a
significant setback for the SEC in 2011. Challenges the SEC has faced
in economic analysis of its rulemaking, and structural reforms adopted
in response to those challenges, opens the door for a discussion on how
the SEC can improve its enforcement process in the same way.
The proxy access rule, the first rule the SEC promulgated pursuant to
the landmark Dodd-Frank Act, was struck down in 2011 by a
* Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. The author gratefully
acknowledges research support from the George Mason University Law School and the George Mason
University Law and Economics Center.
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unanimous panel of the D.C. Circuit, on the grounds that the SEC
conducted insufficient economic analysis of the rule by failing to take
into account the effect of the rule on efficiency, competition, and capital
formation.
The D.C. Circuit opinion summarized that the SEC failed to conduct
an adequate analysis because:
[T]he Commission inconsistently and opportunistically framed the costs
and benefits of the rule; failed adequately to quantify the certain costs or
to explain why those costs could not be quantified; neglected to support
its predictive judgments; contradicted itself, and failed to respond to
substantial problems raised by commenters.1
That defeat came on the heels of two similar defeats for the SEC on
the same grounds in the prior fifteen year period since new rules
requiring additional economic analysis were adopted. 2 In 1996, a
provision contained in the National Securities Markets Improvement Act
(NSMIA) amended the Securities Exchange Act to require that the SEC
consider the impact of new rules on efficiency, competition, and capital
formation in addition to its existing investor protection mission.3
That provision was introduced by Congressman Jack Fields, who
understood it to introduce a form of cost-benefit analysis to SEC
rulemaking, as he introduced the legislation by noting:
This is an important provision of the bill because it will introduce an
element of explicit cost benefit analysis into SEC rulemaking. We want
to encourage the SEC to take efficiency, competition and capital
formation into account in its rulemaking. We view these goals as
complementary to the important goal of investor protection.4
Regulatory cost-benefit analysis began as a field considering the
unanticipated effects of rate and competition regulation by scholars like
Alfred Kahn5 and developed into consideration of the wider tradeoffs
posed in fields like safety regulation by scholars like Kip Viscusi and

1. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
2. See Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). See also Am. Equity
Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 167-68 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
3. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106, 110 Stat.
3416, 3424-25 (1996). The Investment Advisers Act and the Investment Company Act were later
amended by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to include the same provision. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
4. DeregulatingCapital Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. of the
H. Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. (1995), 1995 WL 706020 [hereinafter DeregulatingCapital
Markets] (statement of Jack Fields, Chairman, Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin.).
5. ALFRED E. KAHN, THE EcoNOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (7th

prtg. 1988).
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Richard Zeckhauser.6 That field provides the tools the White House
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) uses to review rules put
forward by executive agencies of the federal government.
This movement toward enhanced cost-benefit analysis in regulation
began within government principally by way of developments in the
functioning of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)
at the White House Budget Office, which was informed by
developments in the law and economics of regulation. Cass Sunstein,
President Obama's former Director of OIRA, described the initial
germination of the agency as beginning in the Nixon and Carter White
Houses and blossoming during the Reagan era into a full executive order
requiring agencies to submit proposed regulations for review.' The
White House OIRA has never sought regulatory review authority over
independent agencies like the SEC however, and so the new three-part
economic analysis standard created by NSMIA serves the same
principal function as OIRA review but is accomplished through judicial
review. 8
Congress responded forcefully to the SEC's most recent economic
analysis defeat with a series of congressional oversight hearings seekinq
explanation for the agency's repeated rebukes by the D.C. Circuit.
Partly in response to those hearings and to the Business Roundtable
case, the SEC began to empower a new Division of the agency, now
called the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis.
In a memorandum promulgated by that Division, the SEC describes
DERA's mission in informing regulation and requiring the SEC to
consider the following in adopting regulations: (1) a statement of the
need for proposed action; (2) the definition of a baseline against which
to measure the likely economic consequences of the proposed
regulation; (3) the identification of alternative regulatory approaches;
and (4) an evaluation of the benefits and costs-both quantitative and
qualitative--of the proposed action and the main alternatives identified
by the analysis.10
And yet if one accepts the basic logic of analysis of the costs and
6. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1912
(1993). See also EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS (1978).

7. See Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order For Improving Federal
Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-BenefitAnalysis, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1489, 1506 (2002).
8. See id.
9. See, e.g., The SEC's Aversion to Cost-Benefit Analysis: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
TARP, Fin. Servs. and Bailouts of Pub. and PrivateProgramsof the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't
Reform, 112th Cong. (2012).
10. See Memoradum from RSFI and OGC to the Staff of the Rulewriting Divisions and Offices 1
(Mar.
16,
2012),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfiguidanceeconanalysecrulemaking.pdf.
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benefits of new regulations, one must also accept the need to apply those
principles to enforcement decisions. Former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt
described how regulation and enforcement often bleed together, as the
SEC prefers to accomplish through enforcement what it may otherwise
attempt by way of regulation:
It is, understandably, far easier for SEC officials to defend and pursue
individual enforcement actions, particularly if they are highly visible
enforcement actions, than to attempt to develop and maintain
comprehensive regulatory responses to difficult and technical industry
and professional issues. To be sure, there are administrative benefits to
such an approach-that is, to the approach of securities regulation by
enforcement. Among other things ... the agency is not required to chart
out, explicate, maintain or perfect a comprehensive solution to identified
issues, taking into account those circumstances where deviation from
normative standards might be appropriate . . . critics and overseers of the
agency's activities are less likely to be able to detect inconsistent
approaches by the agency to comparable problems, or even to ascertain
guiding principles or policies employed by the agency to respond to
certain types of situations."
B. Economics in Securities Enforcement
The new three-part economic analysis requirement added by NSMIA
and Gramm-Leach-Bliley applied to new rulemaking, but a previous
requirement that it also apply to SEC orders was withdrawn from the
original legislation on the recommendation of Chairman Arthur
Leavitt.12 Former Chairman Leavitt did not provide any context for that
argument, but merely asserted in a hearing about that provision that:
At present, the Commission generally requires a cognitive analysis when
it proposes or adopts its rules. The Commission is prepared to strengthen
this requirement by requiring the staff to perform additional analysis of a
rule's impact on competition, efficiency and capital formation. The
Commission does not believe, however, that this analysis would be
appropriate in the context of enforcement actions and adjudicated
opinions. Thus, the Commission would oppose legislation that would
mandate such an analysis in those contexts.
This argument was particularly curious given that some of the rules
the SEC enforces have uniquely economic questions attached to them.
11. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation By Enforcement: A Look
Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 156-57 (1990).
12. Securities Legislation: Hearing on HR. 3005 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin.
of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Thomas J. Bliley Jr., Chairman,
Comm. on Commerce).
13. DeregulatingCapitalMarkets, supranote 4 (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
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The extent to which a potentially harmful disclosure has already been
revealed to the market, and therefore, is not materially harmful to
investors, is one example of a uniquely economic question which forms
one of the key elements in a lOb-5 action, the SEC's principal tool in
combating financial fraud. 14
Dirks v. SEC is an instructive case study in the consequence of excess
discretion for the SEC Enforcement Division. Dirks, an investment
analyst, learned through investigation and conversation with a company
insider that a company in which his clients were invested was engaged
in a massive fraud.' 5 Dirks told his clients of the fraud, and they sold
their investments. Dirks did not bribe the source of the information, and
he even attempted to inform the SEC, the Wall Street Journal, and state
authorities of the fraud, but was ignored.
Dirks was bound by his obligation to his clients to inform them of the
fraud, and did so. Dirks engaged in no inappropriate action to obtain the
information.
Dirks promptly informed all relevant enforcement
authorities. And yet the SEC Enforcement Division targeted him
anyway.
Though the opinion ultimately turned on legal questions about the
doctrine of insider trading, Daniel Fischel notes that the SEC ignored the
economic implications of this action, which if successful could have
significantly hindered investment analysts, through which investors
obtain information about the value of their investments, by reducing
their incentive to conduct due diligence to root out corporate fraud.' 6
The SEC Enforcement Division currently uses DERA to effectively
provide litigation support after a case has been brought, or utilizes
DERA to provide expert guidance during an investigation, but DERA
has no authority to participate in the decision to bring an investigation or
action nor to set the ground rules for how the SEC Enforcement
Division prioritizes its caseload or determines penalties and settlements.
SEC Chair White explains DERA's current role in the SEC's
enforcement actions:
DERA also provides ongoing expert support to the Division of
Enforcement, and its work directly contributed to a number of successful
investigations. For example, last year, economists assisted in several
market manipulation investigations, creating algorithms to analyze the
order and transaction files of high-speed traders and quantify the extent of
suspicious trading. Staff also provided expert testimony to assist with the
freezing of assets in a $150 million fraud scheme, and also aided Federal
14. See Merck & Co., Inc. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2005).
15. See Daniel R. Fischel, Insider Trading and Investment Analysts: An Economic Analysis of
Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 127, 127-30 (1984).
16. See generally Fischel, supranote 15.
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prosecutors in charging insider trading by analyzing evidence of
materiality. 17
The next Part will draw from the Federal Trade Commission's
experience in incorporating economic analysis into its enforcement
process and empowering staff economists in that process to help shape
useful reforms for the SEC as it faces this challenge.
III. LESSONS FROM THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AT THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

A. SimilaritiesBetween the SEC andFTC
The Federal Trade Commission is an agency whose mission and
history is similar enough to the SEC's that it offers a useful benchmark
for gauging the potential for harnessing economics in informing legal
enforcement policy. The SEC, like the FTC, is a consumer protection
agency. The FTC was in fact the agency initially empowered to enforce
the Securities Act of 1933.18 James Landis, a drafter of the Securities
Act, led the Securities Division of the FTC, the division initially
empowered to enforce the law, and focused the agency's initial rules on
disclosure mandates to help investors understand the value of their
investments and antifraud rules to police violations of those rules using
principles developed by the FTC for other consumer regulation. 19
The SEC also functions as a market structure regulator, where its
statutory mission appears similar to the FTC's within the context of
securities exchange oversight. Its operative statute explicitly states that

"competition" is one of its four primary statutory purposes. In Credit
Suisse Securities LLC v. Billino the Supreme Court interpreted the
"competition" reference in the new standard as embodying a mission
that replaces regulatory jurisdiction which would otherwise be enforced
by the FTC. 2 1 Thus it exercises, much like the FTC, a form of
competition authority over the securities exchanges and securities sales.
It also administers a disclosure-based regulatory regime that oversees
the public distribution of statements about the value of publicly traded

17. See Testimony on "Oversight of the SEC's Agenda, Operations and FY 2015 Budget
Request" Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 16 (2014) (statement of Mary Jo White,
Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm.), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-l 13baOO-wstate-mwhite-20140429.pdf.
18. See Joel Seligman, The SEC in a Time ofDiscontinuity,95 VA. L. REv. 667 (2009).
19. 431 Days: Joseph P. Kennedy and the Creationof the SEC (1934-35), SECHISTORICAL.ORG,
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/kennedy/politicians-b.php (last visited Jan. 4, 2014).
20. Credit Suisse Sec. LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007).
21. Id. at 283.
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securities and mutual funds, an analogous mission to the FTC's role in
overseeing public statements about the value of consumer products.
The SEC's primary and most frequently utilized source of
enforcement authority is Section 1Ob of the Securities Exchange Act and
Rule 1Ob-5 promulgated thereunder. That section of the Exchange Act
and the rule thereunder is somewhat ambiguously drafted, conferring a
substantial amount of discretionary authority to the agency's
enforcement function. The Sherman Act's prohibition of "every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade . . . is declared to be illegal" 22 is similar in character to
the Securities Exchange Act's prohibition on "any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance . . . ."23 Both afford substantial
discretion to their regulatory agencies and enforcement attorneys.
The SEC Enforcement Division has, at times, used the discretion it
enjoys under lOb-5 to extend the boundaries of its jurisdiction, as in
cases such as Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,24 SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co.,25 and Dirks v. SEC. 26 Those particular instances of

overreach by the Commission to develop novel theories of liability
under the auspices of lOb-5 were struck down by the courts or those
doctrines were subsequently abandoned by the courts, but represented
costly interventions by the SEC into market activity in the interim. This
challenge calls for a solution, and the FTC's innovations in this area
offer an informed comparison.
B. Lessons from Developments at the FTC
Bill Kovacic, former Chairman of the FTC, describes how selection
of personnel by the President is not the only force that drives
competition policy at the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FTC, but
argues that policy is more directly shaped by the doctrinal changes in the
law and economics of antitrust, which shape enforcement as they are
embodied in changes in legal doctrines developed by the courts and
Congress, as well as internal dynamics within agencies that maintain
momentum across changes in political regimes.2 7
Though Kovacic's claim is specific to competition policy, that same
dynamic can clearly be viewed in the development of securities
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3(a) (2012).

23. Id. § 78j(b).
24.
25.
26.
27.
Norms, 71

Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
See William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement
ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 394 (2003).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

7

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 5

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

498

[VOL. 82

regulation policy described in the last Part, as the SEC is influenced by
courts and Congress, who themselves are influenced by changes in law
and finance. He notes that "[s]tatutes and judicial decisions (formal
legal rules) define the outer boundaries of the agencies' operations, but
the agencies often develop policies or principles that lack the force of
law (norms) to decide how to execute their prosecutorial discretion." 28
The analysis offered in this Article is the next step in the natural
progression of the SEC, if the stages of evolution explored by Kovacic
can be grafted across agencies.
Kovacic describes how the level of institutional capability in
economic analysis directly affects the level of deference courts are
willing to afford an agency that makes claims grounded in economic
analysis. 29 That initial pattern is evident at the SEC as well, given the
low level of institutional commitment the SEC has given to economic
analysis in years since the added three-part standard and the low level of
deference the court seemed to afford the SEC as a result.
Kovacic also argues that it is not enough for an agency to possess
institutional capability in economic analysis, the agency must further
empower that capability in the decision to bring enforcement cases. He
points to how the increasing role of economists in the decision to bring
cases at the FTC marked a key turning point for the agency in the
1970s. 30 Kovacic also describes a useful dynamic relationship between
the agency and the external economics profession, as developments
internal to the agency were more effectively translated into changes in
industrial organization theory once enforcement cases began to develop
within a more vigorous analytical economic framework. 3 1 Those
developments in theory were more then effective at informing future
evolution in enforcement practices in a feedback loop. 32
Another benefit to the evolution of economics-grounded enforcement
actions at the FTC that Kovacic describes is that it yields a more
sophisticated assessment of the value of cases than an overly simplistic
focus merely on simplistic metrics like the number of enforcement cases
brought, the size of the target of the investigation, or the size of the
recovery by the agency. Economics-grounded enforcement actions
instead calculate how likely the case is to deter future wrongdoing and
may consider the value of a particular case to test a novel legal theory.33
As one example, Kovacic argues that the FTC's prioritization of cases
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 395.
See id. at 389-99.
See id. at 400.
See id. at 401.
See id. at 402.
See id. at 405.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss2/5

8

Verret: Economic Analysis in Securities Enforcement: The Next Frontier At

2013]

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS INSECURITIES ENFORCEMENT

499

involving cartels in the construction of infrastructure assets and cases
involving public procurement display a legitimate concern about the
broader economic impact of underlying violations of law apart from
their size or frequency.3 4
Kovacic also argues that one of the more important forms of
economic analysis came with the DOJ's 1982 promulgation of broadbased guidelines that afford greater predictability of, and intellectual
foundation for, enforcement actions. Thus in addition to developing
individual cases, a regulatory agency's economic analysis capability can
also inform macro level decision making at the agency.
C. Molding an Economic Analysis Functionfor SEC Enforcement

The unique structure of the securities laws calls for a few
observations about the application of economic analysis to SEC
enforcement activity. Professors Stephen Choi and Adam Pritchard
observe that behavioral economics, a branch of economics that considers
the behavioral biases of consumers in weighing the costs of regulation,
is not particularly advisable at the SEC given the countervailing
institutional biases of the regulatory agency, combined with the
monopoly regulatory power it enjoys. 36
Behavioral economics is irrelevant for purposes of securities
regulation under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which is the
source of the SEC's frequently used authority under 1Ob-5, for an even
more fundamental reason. The structure of the '34 Act is built around a
presumption of efficient markets, which requires an assumption that the
average investor is rational. The mandatory disclosure architecture of
the '34 Act presumes rational investors able to process the information
required. Likewise, the materiality element of 1Ob-5 and the truth on the
market presumption also assume information shared with the market
will be rationally processed by it. 37
At times the SEC has used its enforcement function to regulate the
structure of the securities exchanges and the fees they are allowed to
charge, such as when the SRO affiliated with NASDAQ was developed
as part of an enforcement settlement over the odd-eights pricing
controversy. 38 Professor Bruce Johnsen has argued that in fulfilling its
34. See id. at 421.
35. See id. at 436.
36. See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, BehavioralEconomics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REv.
1(2003).
37. See J.W. Verret, The Securities Exchange Act is a Material Girl,Living in a Material World,
3 HARV. Bus. L. REv. 453 (2013).
38. See J.W. Verret, Dr. Jones and the Raiders ofLost Capital: Hedge FundRegulation,PartI,
A Self-Regulation Proposal,32 Del. J. Corp. L. 799, 818 (2007).
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market structure function, the SEC must consider the extent to which
pricing differentials or other market dynamics represent negotiated
outcomes between market participants that represent efficient market
solutions to agency cost problems.9
Bruce Johnsen demonstrates, for instance, how mutual fund fee
structures alleged by the SEC to be inequitable or inefficient actually
represent Klein-Leffler type performance bonds of future premium cash
flows in lieu of direct monitoring. 40 Johnsen explores the impact of the
SEC's ban on directed brokerage, noting that the future income streams
associated with directed brokerage can serve as the type of quasi-rent
described by Klein-Crawford-Alchian to bind actors to future
41
Johnsen argues that brokerage is a good subject to
performance.
determination of quality only after purchase, and as such, a broker can
only be induced to assure high quality through the prospective future
income streams of the revenues from directed brokerage. 42 He describes
the link between the initial up-front agreement to market mutual fund
portfolios by the broker and the subsequent agreement by mutual funds
to direct brokerage to the broker as creating the type of quasi-rent
income streams described by Klein-Leffler. 4 3
Johnsen argues that merely looking at the first order apparent conflict
of interest that might arise from directed brokerage arrangements is an
incomplete view, and taking a transaction cost approach can help to
resolve the apparent problem. This can be accomplished by showing
that the arrangement actually benefits investors, much as a transaction
cost framework, including along Kleinn-Leffler lines, has helped to
demonstrate the flaws in early positions of the Federal Trade
Commission on vertical marketing arrangements.4
In developing cases pursuant to its lOb-5 antifraud authority, the SEC
should be required to perform stock price event studies that tease out the
effect of the harm forming the basis of its case on stock price absent the
effect of other market or firm specific events. The event study
methodology is a primary mode of determining both materiality and loss
causation in private securities litigation. In order to fulfill its statutory
mission, the SEC should be held to using the same methods where
39. See D. Bruce Johnsen, Transaction Cost Benefit Analysis, With Applications to Financial
Regulation (2013) (preliminary draft), availableat http://works.bepress.com/d-brucejohnsen/7.
40. Stephen M. Horan & D. Bruce Johnsen, Does Soft Dollar Brokerage Benefit Portfolio
Investors:
Agency
Problem
or
Solution?,
available
at
http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/04-50.pdf.
41. See generally D. Bruce Johnsen, The SEC's Mistaken Ban on Directed Brokerage: A
Transaction Cost Analysis, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1241 (2008).
42. See id. at 1244.
43. See id. at 1245.
44. See id.
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appropriate.45
When making arguments about any deterrent value of cases it brings,
the SEC should also be held at an absolute minimum to the rigor that the
U.S. Sentencing Commission, and those who study the efficiency of its
recommendations, have brought to bear on difficult questions of the
relationship between criminal enforcement penalties and crime
deterrence. This should apply in any instances where the SEC makes
similar arguments about the deterrent effect of its penalties in particular
cases or its penalty structure generally. 46

IV. FIRST STEPS To EMBED ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN SEC ENFORCEMENT
A. Guidance
One useful role for the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis is to
assist the Division of Enforcement with the prioritization of particular
types of cases. Choi and Pritchard note that "[t]he SEC ranks potential
violations based on whether the violations are in an area of enforcement
priority for the SEC."47 DERA can similarly help to prioritize the
SEC's limited resources toward the most useful activity.
In order the fulfill its investor protection mission, the SEC would
need to develop its prioritization schedule in a systematic way using
estimates of the typical net harm caused to investors and to capital
formation by different types of infractions. This is a job for which the
DERA is uniquely qualified, and if DERA were to have a more direct
role in overseeing setting of case prioritization it could also help limit
the tendency of government bureaus to take actions principally to
maximize their budgets and scope of authority.4 8
Zywicki and Stearns note that "Agency employees will prefer agency
expansions, especially into novel areas, to enhance their prospects for
internal promotion as part of a growing enterprise and their
postgovernment career prospects in the private sector."49 Though
DERA employees may be subject to the same public choice dynamics as
attorneys, the unique differences between the economics and legal
45. See Frank Torchio, ProperEvent Study Analysis in Securities Litigation, 35 J. CORP. L. 159
(2009).
46. See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On Offense History and the Theory of
Deterrence,18 INT'L REV. L. & ECoN. 305 (1998).
47. See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS

750 (3d ed. 2012).
48. See MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND

APPLICATIONS IN LAW 342 (2009) (citing WILLIAM A. NISKANEN JR., BUREAUCRACY AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971)).

49. See Steams & Zywicki, supra note 48, at 343.
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professions may disrupt those forces. For example, attorneys have a
professional culture built on the adversary system, whereas professional
economists tend to be more grounded in the scientific method.
The DERA can also serve an important function in promulgating
guidance about how the Enforcement Division should calculate
economic harm in other contexts which it purports to conduct. In an
Enforcement Division Staff Report offering guidance on how
cooperation will be used to decrease penalties in investigations, the
Enforcement Division references a number of economic determinations,
such as "[h]ow much harm has the misconduct inflicted upon investors
and other corporate constituencies? Did the share price of the
company's stock drop significantly upon its discovery and
disclosure? ... Did the company appropriately recompense those
adversely affected by the conduct?. . . Did the company adopt and
ensure enforcement of new and more effective internal controls and
procedures designed to prevent a recurrence of the misconduct?"5 0
The variables referenced in that report touch on issues debated
extensively in the finance and economics literature. Whether, and the
extent to which, corporate governance reforms like independent
directors, changes in board composition or size, and various other
reforms actually enhance shareholder value across the board, or at
particular subsets of companies, is widely debated.'
Without the
direction of DERA in setting appropriate general guidance and
assistance in applying those concepts to particular enforcement cases,
what has resulted are litigation releases from the SEC Enforcement
Division that merely recite the concepts listed in the SEC's Enforcement
Commission Statements, but do not analyze their relevance to facts in a
specific case, or provide justification for how a particular penalty or fine
is related to those objectives.
B. Structuraland ProcessReform

Structural and procedural reform at the SEC will be required in order
to ensure a primary role for DERA in making economic determinations
at the heart of the SEC's enforcement mission. This would require a
role in both litigation as well as in administrative proceedings that

50. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions,
Exchange Act Release No. 44,969, 76 SEC Docket 220, 2001 WL 1301408, at *3 (Oct. 23, 2001).
51.

See generally ROBERTA ROMANO, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 410-25 (2d ed.

2010).
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require economic determinations. 52 For those determinations made by
SEC Enforcement personnel in lieu of reporting up to the full
Commission, this would require that DERA obtain co-equal authority to
the Division. For those determinations made by the full Commission, it
would require that DERA obtain authority to provide supplemental staff
reports to the full Commission or sign off on the Enforcement
Division's staff report.

DERA is currently the only Division of the SEC which does not have
staff authority expressly delegated to it in the operating rules of the
SEC. A simple way to provide delegated authority to DERA would be
to amend the SEC's operating rules so that DERA could serve as a
check on the authority delegated to the other Divisions. The SEC could
adopt a resolution providing:
The following language is hereby added to Section 200.23a of the
Commission's internal operating rules: "The Office of Economic
Analysis shall be led by the Director of Economic and Risk Analysis.
The Office may suspend any authority delegated to any staff of the
Commission with respect to a particular matter upon a finding that the
Director cannot determine that the benefits of the action exceed its costs.
In that instance, the Director shall submit an analysis of the decision to
the Commission. In that instance, the delegated authority will remain
suspended with respect to that particular matter until such time as it is
renewed by an act of the Commission."
The SEC economic analysis division remains lightly staffed relative
to total employees compared to the same ratio at other agencies, the
Federal Trade Commission has roughly 10% of its staff designated as

economists, relative to only 1%at the SEC. In addition to empowering
those employees, the SEC must commit to allocating a more significant
percentage of its budgetary resources to DERA. Once sufficiently
equipped to inform the Enforcement Division's priorities and the
legitimacy of its cases, DERA can also contribute to review of
enforcement personnel by scoring the relative economic impact of
enforcement cases they resolved that year, and compare against a
standardized distribution of other employees at the agency, using
metrics like the relative rate of growth in an ongoing fraud projected
forward to determine fraudulent activity prevented by an enforcement
action.

52. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (2012). Under Section 21(c) of the Exchange Act, the SEC has the
authority to issue temporary cease and desist orders upon determining a violation is "likely to result in
significant dissipation or conversion of assets, significant harm to investors, or substantial harm to the
public interest ..... Id. §78u-3(c)(1).
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V. CONCLUSION

The SEC has a vital mission to protect investors and maintain sound
markets. That mission cannot be effectively accomplished until the SEC
places economic analysis at the vanguard of the full breathe of its
regulatory function. Economic analysis will not stand in the way of an
aggressive enforcement agenda, but merely ensure that agenda is
directed toward preventing activity most harmful to investors and
markets.
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